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Abstract: The paper examines the form of government outlined in the 1921 
constitution, from the perspective of the principle of the separation of powers. Special 
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As is well known, a system of government is understood to mean the 
interconnections between legislative and executive authorities, as well as the 
relationships within the executive power, i.e. the relations between the 
government and the head of state. Depending on how these relations are 
defined – as we know – two basic forms of government developed 
historically: a presidential system of government and a parliamentary 
(parliamentary-cabinet) system. The first written constitution in the world, 
the American Constitution, introduced a presidential system of government, 
while a parliamentary system was adopted in the Polish Constitution of 3 
May 1791, which expressis verbis established the principle of the political 
accountability of ministers to the Sejm (the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Senate). I recall this because the main idea that accompanied work on the 
constitution of the reborn Polish State was to drew on – as far as possible –  
the "glorious tradition of the memorable Constitution of 3 May", as we read 
in the preamble to the March Constitution. It is therefore not surprising that 
among the creators of the March Constitution of 1921, there was a general 
consensus as to principles of the political system: sovereignty of the nation, 
the separation of powers and parliamentary rule, as the heritage of Polish 
legal and political thought1. Although the idea of borrowing the presidential 
system of government appeared at that time, it remained completely on the 
margins of the work on the constitution (it was the draft constitution by 
 
1 W.Suleja, Sukcesorzy Sejmu Wielkiego. Sejm Ustawodawczy 1919-1922. Między budową 
nowoczesnej Polski a partykularyzmem Polski, [in:] Przegląd Sejmowy 1(150)2019, p.256. 
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Professor Józef Buzek, mentioned by Professor Orlandi). It is noteworthy – 
which was also emphasised by Ms Orlandi – that the constitutional debate 
covered various social groups and milieus, not only political ones.  
 
Fairly important for the general acceptance of the parliamentary 
model of power in the drafts of the March Constitution were also the 
experiences of the political system at the dawn of independence. As early as 
in Józef Piłsudski's first decree of 14 November 1918 there was the 
statement that: “only the Sejm can be the creator of the nation's rights”. The 
Sejm was to be convened as soon as possible. It should be stressed that – as 
Professor Orlandi rightly points out – the election to the Legislative Sejm 
based on the “five-part electoral law” (universal, direct, equal, proportional 
and anonymous elections) – produced a democratic representation of the 
entire society. The so-called Small Constitution of 20 February 1919, passed 
by the Legislative Sejm, recognised the Sejm as a "sovereign and legislative 
authority", to which the bodies of executive power, i.e. the Chief of State 
(Józef Piłsudski) and the government, were fully subordinated. The Chief of 
State, as the "supreme executor of resolutions of the Sejm in civil and 
military matters", was politically accountable to it. The Chief of State was 
to appoint the government "in agreement with the Sejm". The government 
was also politically accountable to the Sejm. It was a joint responsibility of 
the government as well as a personal responsibility of individual ministers. 
The Small Constitution of 20 February 1919 thus introduced parliamentary 
rule in its extreme form2. Just like the Small Constitution, the March 
Constitution did not specify the procedure for appointing the government – 
as Professor Orlandi rightly notes. In other words, both the tradition and 
constitutional practice determined that there was no alternative to a 
parliamentary system of government at the time when the March 
Constitution was drafted. 
 
The problem for the authors of the March Constitution was obviously the 
choice of a modern model of parliamentary government, as it was difficult to 
transfer the political model of the 18th century to the 20th century. 
(Władysław Seyda's speech in the Sejm). This was explicitly admitted by the 
Constitutional Committee's chairman, Professor Edward Dubanowicz, who 
stated during a parliamentary debate that the Committee wanted to base the 
state system not on "attempts and experiments", but on the experience of its 
own country, and in particular on the experience of other countries. 
Therefore, the starting point for the Constitutional Committee in preparing 
its draft was the adoption of a system that had been tried and tested in at 
 
2 K. Kaczmarczyk-Kłak, System rządów w Polsce w latach 1918-1922,[in:] Studia 
Prawnicze KUL, 1(73)2018 ,p.68. 
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least one of the larger states3. That is why it is not surprising that the 
content of the March Constitution drew on political systems in those 
countries whose constitutionalism had been favourably assessed by the legal 
and political elites of the reborn Polish state. As far as the system of 
government was concerned, the authors of the March Constitution followed 
the constitutional model of the Third French Republic, while the provisions 
on judicial power were based in many points on the wording of the 
provisions of the Austrian Basic Law on Judicial Power of 1867, the so-called 
December Constitution. Similarly, the provisions of the Austrian December 
Constitution on the general rights of citizens were reflected in many articles 
of Section Five of the March Constitution, entitled "General Duties and 
Rights of Citizens"4. The reference to the constitutionalism of the Habsburg 
Monarchy was due to the fact that its political model was favourably 
assessed in many aspects (also in the Austrian Republic established after 
1918). 
 
So what determined that the parliamentary system of government in March 
Constitution was based on the French model? Certainly significant was the 
fact that France was the only example of a country with a republican system, 
where the parliamentary system of government took the fullest shape. The 
republican form of state determined by the Act of Jędrzej Moraczewski’s 
government of 1918 was never questioned afterwards. It was on the basis of 
the French system that the doctrinal principles of modern parliamentarism 
could be constructed, as in its general assumptions it corresponded to the 
Polish parliamentary tradition, which clearly treated with reserve a strong 
executive power (in France the parliament exercised legislative power 
directly and the executive power indirectly through the ministers, while in 
the Constitution of 3 May the Sejm ruled by means of elected government 
commissions, accountable to the Sejm). The system of the Third Republic 
proved attractive to the drafters of the Polish Constitution also for the 
reason that the head of state had little role to play in the structure of the 
executive power. The position of the President was limited by its dependence 
on the government through the institution of countersignature. It was 
therefore quite widely accepted that the President would be elected by the 
combined chambers of Parliament, following the French model, as it was the 
French experience of the Second French Republic which showed that 
 
3 A.Kulig, Kształtowanie formy rządów u progu niepodległej Polski (1917-1926), 
Warszawa 2013, p. 274. 
4 P. Czarny, Einfluss des österreichischen öffentlichen Rechts aus  der Periode der 
konstitutionellen Monarchie (1867-1918) auf polnisches Verfassungs-und Verwaltungsrecht in 
der Zwischenkrieszeit und der Gegenwart, [in:] Das Ősterreich-Ungarn der Jahre 1866-
1918: ein herausragender Beitrag zum Schutze der Menschenrechte, Beiträge zur 
Konferenz, Straßburg 17.en 18.November 2017, hrsg. A.Duranthon. C.Haguenau-
Moizard&K.Wojtyczek, 2019, p.220-228. 
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universal election of the President could be a mandate for a change in the 
state political system towards autocracy. 
 
The conditions of the political situation at the time meant that the drafters 
of the March Constitution did not choose an active presidential model. 
Therefore, they ignored other models of parliamentary government, such as 
the model introduced by the German Weimar Constitution of 1919. The 
German experiment seemed too risky to them. They opted for a 
parliamentary model, in which the executive branch had no mechanism to 
counterbalance the political will of the parliament. The President was thus 
not given the right to dissolve Parliament on his own in the event of a 
conflict between the Sejm and the government. Thus, he did not have the 
position of a neutral authority playing the role of a political arbiter, but his 
actions were restricted by both the parliament and the government. The 
authors of the Polish constitution didn’t use the advice  of Robert Redslob, 
recalled by Professor Orlandi, who showed the advantages of the English 
model of parliamentary government5. 
 
However, this remark should be supplemented with the comment that the 
draft Constitution prepared at the beginning of 1919 under the guidance of 
Professor M. Bobrzyński in the form of the so-called Questionnaire, which 
was the basis of the work of the Legislative Sejm, adopted a model of 
parliamentary rule in a version combining elements of the system of the 
Third French Republic and the presidential system in the United States. The 
creators of the Questionnaire, attaching great importance to the principle 
the tripartite separation of powers and balance between them, made a 
modification of the French parliamentary system by strengthening the 
political position of the President, but this idea was rejected by the deputies 
for the reasons indicated above. Thus, following the American model, the 
President was to come from a democratic, universal but two-stage election. 
The draft Constitution of the Republic of Poland prepared by Polish 
professors of law as part of the Government's Questionnaire modified the 
French parliamentary model by introducing a certain balance between the 
legislative and executive powers, which was a feature of American 
constitutionalism.  
 
The modification granted the President the right of a suspensive veto over 
the acts of the two-chamber parliament. Within 30 days, the President was 
obliged to proclaim an enacted act or to return it to the parliament for re-
examination. The re-enactment of an act by a two-thirds majority meant 
that the President was obliged to proclaim it without delay. The draft, 
however, in its reference to the Constitution of the Third French Republic, 
provided for a broad definition of the Government's political responsibility. 
 
5 A.Kulig, Kształtowanie…,op.cit., p. 75-76. 
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Ministers bore parliamentary responsibility before both chambers for the 
general political direction of the government, jointly and individually “for 
their personal acts”. As in the case of the French Constitution, the draft did 
not specify the procedure for holding ministers politically accountable. 
Neither did the draft in question specify in detail the manner in which the 
Government was to be formed, which meant that the March Constitution 
adopted a solution similar to that of the French Constitution, leaving this 
matter to parliamentary practice6. 
 
Although according to the March Constitution the President appointed and 
dismissed the President of the Council of Ministers, and ministers at his 
request, nevertheless the Sejm had the right to hold ministers politically 
accountable by a simple majority of votes. The fact that the March 
Constitution did not contain a detailed procedure for appointing the 
government – as Professor Orlandi rightly stresses – resulted in the 
emergence of a parliamentary custom whereby the government formed by 
the President asked the Sejm for a vote of confidence. The political practice 
following the introduction of the March Constitution showed that President 
Stanisław Wojciechowski entrusted the mission of forming a government to 
the person who was likely to win a majority in the Sejm. On the one hand, 
therefore, the process of forming a government was not easy due to the 
considerable fragmentation of the political forces in the Sejm, while on the 
other hand it was potentially easy to dismiss the government by passing a 
vote of no confidence. The practice of the political system in the first years 
after the adoption of the March Constitution showed that, as in the Third 
French Republic, there were governmental upheavals, which constituted, as 
it were, an inherent feature of French parliamentarism. Nevertheless, it was 
not treated by the authors of the March Constitution as a defect of the 
French system, since the Third Republic proved strong enough to be one of 
the victors in the First World War. Moreover, the adoption of the French 
political model was also to facilitate the building of a political alliance 
between Poland and France. 
 
In conclusion, therefore, a fundamental question needs to be asked as to 
whether the system of government introduced by the March Constitution 
was inherently dysfunctional. Did its shortcomings result in a political crisis, 
which Józef Piłsudski's May Coup of 1926 was intended to counteract? The 
May Coup took place under the banner of fighting “parliamentocracy” (in 
Polish: sejmokracja), which was disastrous for the state, and the need to 
 
6 See the draft of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland drawn up by the 
Questionnaire established by the Government on 25 January 1919 and debating from 
January to March of that year under the chairmanship of Michał Bobrzyński, 1919, the 
Jagiellonian Library, Rkp.8131 III, 
https://jbc.bj.uj.edu.pl/dlibra/publication/488683/edition/502777/content, accessed 
on 3 July 2021. 
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reform political life7. It should be noted that the instability of governments 
was not only a feature of the Polish model of parliamentarism. It was also 
present in those varieties of parliamentarism which provided for a brake or 
counterbalance to parliamentary hypertrophy, as was the case in Germany 
or Czechoslovakia. However, the constitutional practice was too short to 
fully assess the weaknesses of the system of government adopted by the 
March Constitution. Nevertheless, it is true that the drafters of the March 
Constitution consciously relied on a model of parliamentary government 
that assumed the supremacy of the parliamentary factor over government 
power. 
 
At the same time, however, it should be noted that the model of 
parliamentary rule introduced in the March Constitution met with serious 
criticism from legal scholars before it even entered into force. Part of the 
criticism came from those who were involved in the preparation of the 
Questionnaire mentioned above. In particular, the incorrect implementation 
of the principle of separation of powers in the March Constitution was 
emphasised. It was argued that it was used only insofar as it served to inhibit 
the executive by the legislature, but not vice versa. In particular, it was 
regretted that the President was not given the independent right to dissolve 
the Parliament. It was stressed that a President elected by the Sejm and the 
Senate and having no right to dissolve the Parliament motu proprio had to be 
dependent on it. Critics of the system of government in the March 
Constitution found insufficient the solution according to which the 
President could dissolve the Sejm with the consent of the Senate, which was 
itself subject to dissolution if such consent was given.   
 
The case of dissolution of Parliament by the President, as provided for by 
the Constitution, was considered unlikely. It was pointed out that this 
provision was faulty in terms of ensuring stability of the State authority. 
There were therefore questions asked about the actual potential 
consequences of depriving the President of the right to dissolve the 
parliament on his own: if the President had been in conflict with the 
Government, he would not have been able to grant it its resignation because 
he would have not found anyone in the Parliament who could form a 
Government without a parliamentary majority behind him. A new majority 
could only be formed by calling a new election. If, in turn, the Government 
had come into conflict with the Sejm, it would have no choice but to resign, 
as the President could not protect the Government from collapse by 
dissolving the Parliament. Thus, a strong conviction was expressed that the 
March Constitution did not introduce an important safeguard against the 
 
7 .M. Kowalski, The Amendment of August 1926 to the first Polish Constitution of the Second 
Republic,[in:] Krakowskie Studia z Historii Państwa i Prawa 2014;7(2), p.318-322. 
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omnipotence of the Sejm majority in the form of the Head of State's right to 
dissolve the Parliament. 
 
To justify this view, reference was made to the example of the French 
system, which – as the argument went – was a typical state of governmental 
crises. However, if France nevertheless remained a strong state, this had to 
be attributed to the specific features of its internal relations, which were 
definitely lacking in Poland, such as an efficient administration and a 
politically well-informed society. This is why there were warnings that a 
system of parliamentary rule modelled on the French system might not 
work in the entirely different reality of post-war Poland. Poland, which was 
threatened from two sides, could maintain its independence – it was argued 
– only in the conditions of a well-organised state, with a strong Government 
as its most important link. In order to achieve this aim, it was proposed that 
the content of the March Constitution be changed in, inter alia, three points: 
the election of the President according to the American model, granting him 
the right to dissolve the Sejm and Senate on his own, and balancing the 
positions of both parliamentary chambers. Therefore, as soon as the March 
Constitution was passed, the system of government adopted in it was 
criticised, albeit with the hope that the Parliament elected on its basis would 
nevertheless be capable of organising a modern, strong and law-abiding 
state8. 
 
It was not until the March Constitution came into force in the conditions of 
a certain political crisis, related to the assassination of President Gabriel 
Narutowicz or the withdrawal of Józef Piłsudski from state life, that doubts 
were raised as to whether the relations between Parliament, Government 
and President had been correctly defined. Critical assessment of the adopted 
model of government usually led to a proposal to strengthen the executive 
power at the expense of limiting the rights of the Sejm (e.g. by granting the 
President an independent right to dissolve parliament independently and 
limiting the Sejm's use of a vote of no confidence in ministers and the 
government).  
 
Voices that the March Constitution should be changed in the above direction 
were clearly visible in the opinions expressed by Polish constitutionalists 
 
8 See Our Constitution. A series of lectures organised by the School of Political Sciences 
in Kraków between 12 and 25 May 1921 with the participation of Wład. Abraham, Tad. 
Dwernicki, Stan. Estreicher, Wł. L. Jaworski, St. Kutrzeba, M. Rostworowski, St. 
Wróblewski and Fryd. Zoll, Kraków 1922 
https://kpbc.umk.pl/dlibra/publication/70156/edition/77775/content, accessed on 3 
July2021. 
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and jurists in a questionnaire conducted in 1925 by “Ruch Prawniczy, 
Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny” [The Legal, Economic and Sociological 
Movement] published in Poznań. The journal asked for a brief response to 
three questions: (1) what devices of our constitutional system function badly 
and cause adverse results, (2) in what direction is it desirable to change the 
Constitution, and (3) in what direction is it desirable and possible for the 
present Sejm and Senate to change the electoral law without changing the 
Constitution. 
 
In most of the presented opinions there was a conviction that the most 
significant flaw of the March Constitution was the way it regulated the 
mutual relations between the Sejm and the Government, as well as the 
relations between the Government and the President. The greatest 
objections were raised as regards the fact that the Constitution did not 
guarantee a balance between the legislative and executive powers, since, on 
the one hand, the Sejm held all the legislative power, and, on the other hand, 
it was the source and regulator of the executive power. A similar domination 
of the representative body over the governmental power – as some critics 
pointed out – was unknown in any of the modern European constitutions. 
They even argued that the prototype of such a model could only be traced 
either in the principle of a sovereign absolute monarch, or in the French 
Convention of the revolutionary period. 
 
This negative state of affairs was seen as a problem which might be rectified 
by amending the March Constitution as regards, inter alia, the method of 
electing the President by indirect universal elections, granting him a share 
in the legislative power, as well as the right to dissolve the parliamentary 
chambers. As far as the legislative power was concerned, the President was 
to be granted the right to object to bills submitted to the Sejm by the 
Government, as well as the right to a suspensive veto over the enacted acts. 
The lack of the President's power to dissolve Sejm was seen as a mistake, 
because in this way the executive power was deprived of a tool rightly 
regarded as a corrective and counterbalance to "parliamentary absolutism". 
The President should have not only the legal, but also the actual possibility 
of appealing at any time to the nation to find out what the will of the majority 
was at a given moment.  
 
None of the critics of the time, however, advocated a rejection of 
parliamentary rule, but favoured its rationalisation in the political system, 
mainly by granting the President the right to dissolve the Sejm, since – as 
was repeatedly argued – he had to have in his hands a means by which he 
could "influence the disclosure and crystallisation of a specified 
parliamentary majority". The provisions of the March Constitution – 
according to its critics – had the negative effect of leading to the formation 
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of weak governments, as their functioning depended on a random and 
unpredictable parliamentary majority, since the Sejm passed a vote of no 
confidence in a government or minister by a simple majority. The right to 
dissolve the Parliament strengthened not only the President's position and 
authority, but also that of the government itself, which ceased to be "a ball 
thrown in different directions by the changing moods of the political parties, 
and became the representative of a certain political programme for which it 
demanded a clear support of the Sejm". 
 
In contrast, the opinions that it would be premature to criticise the 
constitutional norms defining the relation between the legislative and 
executive bodies were rare. A minority opinion was that the existing 
constitutional practice had not demonstrated any particular need to grant 
the President the right of sanction, or a suspensive veto over acts, or to 
amend the provisions addressing to the nature and purpose of parliamentary 
liability of ministers. Others were not convinced by the argument that the 
constitutional practice had not yet proved that the model of relations 
between public authorities adopted in the March Constitution, and already 
tested elsewhere, was inadequate for Poland9. 
 
The proposed changes of the March Constitution in the direction of limiting 
"exuberant parliamentarism" were carried out by the amendment of the 
Constitution of 2 August 192610. The Act on the Amendment of the March 
Constitution modified six articles concerning budgetary matters, issuing 
regulations with the force of a statute, early dissolution of chambers, the 
manner of expressing a vote of no confidence, and the loss of a seat in the 
Sejm. The Act thus introduced a strict schedule for the budget work of the 
Sejm and Senate, failure to meet which by the chambers meant that the 
budget was to be binding in the form in which it had been prepared by the 
Government. The President of the Republic could dissolve the Sejm and 
Senate before the end of the term at the request of the Council of Ministers, 
but only once for the same reason. Therefore the Sejm lost the right to 
dissolve itself by its own resolution.  
 
The President also had the right, during the period when the chambers were 
dissolved and until the Sejm reconvened, to issue regulations with the force 
of an statute in cases of emergency. These could concern all legislative 
matters with exceptions specified in the Act, such as amending the 
Constitution, the parliamentary electoral law or the levying of taxes. 
Regulations with the force of a statute lost their effect if they were not 
 
9 A questionnaire on the revision of the Polish Constitution and the electoral law: 
https://repozytorium.amu.edu.pl/bitstream/10593/19887/1/018%20Ankieta%20RP
EiS%205%282%29%2c%201925.pdf, accessed on 3 July2021. 
10 Ibidem. 
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submitted to the Sejm within 14 days after the next meeting of the Sejm, or 
if, after being submitted to the Sejm, they were repealed by the Sejm. Article 
6 of the August 1926 Amendment stated that a motion demanding the 
resignation of the Council of Ministers or individual ministers could not be 
put to a vote during the meeting of the Sejm when it was proposed. This 
provision protected against the passing of a vote of no confidence in a 
random manner by a small majority. This solution enabled the Government 
and the President to take behind-the-scenes measures, including using the 
threat of an early election, to defend the Government's policy11. 
 
However, this "correction" of the system of parliamentary rule, aimed at 
establishing a certain balance between the legislative and executive powers, 
did not have a major effect in curbing the too frequent fluctuations of the 
government. Cabinet changes were thus, as it were, inherent part of the 
system of parliamentary rule until the April Constitution was adopted in 
1935. What was important for the state, was the stability of this system of 
government, which made it possible to pursue policies in line with the 






11 A. Ajnenkiel, Polskie konstytucje, Warszawa 1983,np.281 ff. 
